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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and
Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided
missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having
a Naval Reserve surface ship program and documents the cost
savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF. A
representative annual cost to operate an Active Fleet FFG is
compared to the annual cost of a NRF FFG; the primary source
of cost data is the Visibility and Management of Operating and
Support Costs (VAMOSC) data base provided by the Naval Center
for Cost Analysis. The thesis also sets up theoretical
depreciation schedules for selected ships to examine how this













I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1
A. PURPOSE ............................................ 1
B. METHODOLOGY ........................................ 2
II. BACKGROUND ............................................. 3
A. THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE ............................ 3
B. OLIVER HAZARD PERRY CLASS FRIGATES .................. 6
III. MANPOWERCOSTS ......................................... 9
A. MANNING ............................................ 9
B. PAY AND ALLOWANCES ................................ 10
C. BASIC PAY AND RETIREMENT ACCRUAL ................... 12
D. RETIREMENT COMPUTATION ........................... 14
IV. MAINTENANCE COSTS ..................................... 18
A. MAINTENANCE CONCEPT .............................. 18
B. ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL MAINTENANCE ................... 20
C. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MAINTENANCE .................... 24
D. DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE .......................... 26
V. OPERATING COSTS ....................................... 30
A. DIRECT COSTS ...................................... 31
B. INDIRECT COSTS .................................... 34
VI. DEPRECIATION COSTS .................................... 36
A. RATIONALE FOR DEPRECIATION ........................ 36
B. STRAIGHT-LINE METHOD ............................. 37
C. ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION ......................... 39
iv
VII. PERFORMANCE ........................................... 43
A. ENGINEERING READINESS ............................. 43
B. MATERIAL CONDITION ................................ 45
C. SUPPLY MANAGEMENT ................................. 46
VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................ 49
A. TOTALSAVINGS ..................................... 50
B. GULF WAR EXPERIENCE ............................... 52
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................... 55
I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to capture and evaluate
costs associated with operating and supporting Oliver Hazard
Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG-7 class); then to
compare the costs between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force
(NRF) ships. Sixteen of the fifty-one Perry class frigates
have been transferred to the NRF in an effort to improve
reserve readiness and provide cost savings. It is generally
recognized that transfer of forces to the NRF will result in
lower operating expenses. This thesis will quantify the
difference between Active Fleet (AF) and NRF ships' operating
costs for all FFGs. It will also factor the present value of
future compensation such as retirement accrual into a ship's
annual operating cost.
Additionally, since the transfer of modern ships to the
reserves represents the utilization of expensive items of
capital investment, this thesis will compute annual operating
cost using civilian depreciation methods. Although not
generally used in government accounting, depreciation is
useful in arriving at an annual expense to be assigned for the
use of investment items.
1
B. METHODOLOGY
This thesis will use the Visibility and Management of
Ships Costs (VAMOSC) data base as the primary source of
information on annual operating expense. It will also draw on
the Naval Sea Systems Command ship acquisition data base to
set up theoretical depreciation schedules.
Performance will also be studied to determine whether
measurable differences exist in operating performance between
AF and NRF ships. This thesis will use Operational Propulsion
Plant Examination (OPPE) and Supply Management Inspection
(SMI) results and data of Pacific Fleet ships to determine
whether significant material and operational performance
differences exist between the two categories of ships.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE
The primary mission of the U. S. Navy is to conduct
sustained combat operations at sea in support of American
national interests under Title 10 of the U. S. Code. The
mission of the Naval Reserve under 10 USC 262 is to provide
trained units and qualified personnel to augment the Active
Fleet in time of war, national emergency and at such other
times as national security requires.
Naval reserve forces were first established in the late
nineteenth century when revolutionary changes in ship design
and construction such as steam propulsion, rifled artillery,
steel armor plating, made operating naval forces very capable
but also very expensive. Every major naval power created a
naval reserve because the cost of maintaining large regular
navies was prohibitive. Reserves would make wartime expansion
of the navy possible while allowing lower peacetime
expenditures. In the United States, the Naval Reserve was
administered by state naval militias that operated as a branch
of the National Guard in coastal states. Soon after war broke
out in Europe, the Naval Reserve became a Federal government
function by the Congressional Act of March 3, 1915. After
America entered World War I, 30,000 officers and 305,000
enlisted men served on active duty in the Naval Reserve.
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In World War II much of the naval expansion which took
place was made up by the Reserve. By January 1945, seventy-
five percent of the 3.2 million men and women on active duty
were reserves.'
In the defense build-up of 1978-1986, the Naval Reserve
took on new significance. Because of the increasingly long
lead times on ship construction, the U. S. did not anticipate
being able to build ships and put them into commission during
a general conventional war with the Soviet Union. We would
presumably have to fight with ships already in commission.
Accordingly, it was decided to expand the Naval Reserve Force
and provide them with more modern platforms by transferring
sixteen Oliver Hazard Perry class FFGs and eight Knox class
FFs from the Active Fleet. As NRF units, the ships would have
composite active and reserve crews. The full-time portion of
the crew includes both regular Navy (USN) and reserves
(USNR/TAR); TAR stands for Training and Administration of
Reserves. For organizational and reporting purposes, TARs are
different from regular USN, but since they are full-time, TARs
cost virtually the same as USN crew members. The part-time
portion of the crew (approximately twenty-six percent of the
ship's complement) is called Selected Reserve (SELRES).
SELRES is defined as "that portion of the ready reserve
1 Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, RADM
Julius A. Furer, Naval History Division, Department of the Navy,
1959.
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consisting of units and individual reservists designated by
the Chief of Naval Operations as so essential to initial
wartime requizements that they have priority over other
reserve elements" (OPNAVINST 1001.21). In peacetime, SELRES
members drill one weekend each monta and two weeks each
summer for a total of 38 days per year. In the event of a
general mobilization, the SELRES portion of the crew would be
brought on active duty for one year and the NRF ships would
deploy with the Active Fleet. Wartime employment of 51 FFGs
(including 16 NRF) and 50 FFs (including 8 NRF) would be done
as illustrated in Table 1:
TABLE 1
WARTIME EMPLOYMENT OF FRIGATES
Amphibious Forces 8
7 Military Convoys 63
10 Underway Replen- 30
ishment Groups
Total 1012
This deployment of forces would have been possible only by
mobilizing SELRES crews on the 24 NRF combatant ships. It
must also be noted that with the decommissioning of AF Knox
class frigates, the above scenario is no longer envisioned,
but it is presented as an illustration of how the NRF ships
would be integrated into the Active Fleet in time of war.
2 Naval Institute Guide to Ships and Aircraft of the U. S.
Fleet, 15th edition, Norman Polmar, U. S. Naval Institute Press,
1993.
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S. OLIVER HAZARD PERRY CLASS FRIGATES
The Oliver Hazard Perry class friqates comprised the
numerically largest U. S. surface ship building program since
WWII with fifty-one units completed for the U. S. and four
units sold to the Royal Australian Navy. The genesis of the
Perry class was Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt's Project 60 of 1971. Project 60 sought to solve the
problem of block obsolescence of WW II-era surface combatants;
many Fletcher, Gearing and Forrest Sherman class destroyers
were coming up on retirement and the USSR was in the midst of
Admiral Gorshkov's naval build-up. Unless the U. S. could
respond accordingly, it appeared that Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOC) to Western Europe would be threatened in
the event of war or international crisis. As Admiral Arleigh
Burke said to Zumwalt, "You need numbers."'
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Perry class patrol frigates would be the low end of
Zumwalt's controversial High-Low mix. The "low" ships were
designed-to-cost so that a maximum number of fairly effective,
relatively inexpensive ships could provide sea control over a
wide area and relieve more expensive cruisers and destroyers
to escort the carrier battle groups. The cost constraint was
to: design, build and deliver the ships for $50 million each
(1973 dollars) .4 The cost constraint was never attained as
3 On Watch, Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. New York, NY 1976.
4 Ibid.
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Drvdockina Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA) . The SRAi
the ships were built for an average of $108 million (1973
dollars). The closest the shipbuilders could come to the
constraint was the rstocin (FFG-15), which was delivered for
$80 million after Bath Iron Works had conquered the learning
curve. Subsequently, costs rose as later versions (flights)
of the Perry class had additional major equipments installed
at construiction. The acquisition cost of the fifty-one ships
was 16.795 billion 1991 dollars, or $330 million per ship
(source: NAVSEA 017 ship acquisition data base).
The ships were commissioned between 1977 and 1989. They
displace between 3600 and 4100 tons and their primary mission
is anti-submarine warfare (ASW). They also have anti-air and
anti-ship capability with their Mark 13 guided missile
launcher and forty missile magazine. They were not originally
delivered with Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) and therefore
could not be fully integrated into the carrier battle group
(CVBG) anti-air warfare scheme in a high threat environment.
"Despite that shortcoming, they are excellent platforms and are
useful to CVBGs in low threat or ASW scenarios. They are
extremely good at ASW, especially with the addition of the
LAMPS MKIII SH-60B helicopter (in FFG-8 and FFG-36 through
61), and the SQQ-89 ASW system with associated SQR-19 towed
array sonar (in FFG-8 and FFG-28 through 61).
Twelve FFGs were deployed in support of operation Desert
Shield/Storm where they were involved in blockade,
surveillance and special operations against Iraqi-held islands
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and observation platforms. Two of the ships have been heavily
damaged in action - the Stark (FFG-31) was struck by two Iraqi
Exocet missiles (one Exocet warhead did not explode but its
fuel added to the devastating fire which killed 37 crewmen) in
1987 and the Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) hit an Iranian-laid
mine in 1988. Both ships were saved by excellerint damage
control and were repaired and returned to full service.
Stark's repairs cost approximately $90 million and Roberts'
cost approximately $37.5 million.
Given the nominal thirty-year life expected of surface
combatants, all of these successful ships would be in
commission until the year 2007 with the last one being
decommissioned in 2019. However, recent defense plans show




As with any weapon system, manpower is a crucial
consideration. The FFG-7 class is no exception. Cost and
manpower constraints were central issues in the design of this
ship.
In effect, the Perry class FFG replaced the Gearing and
Forrest Sherman classes of destroyers. In comparison to the
Gearing class DD, with a displacement of 2800 tons and a crew
of 370, the Perry class displaces 3600 - 4100 tons with a crew
of 214; the ship is 46% larger with a crew 42% smaller than
the Gearing. This reduction in manpower reflected a thirty-
year jump in technology from the WWII Gearings with their
labor-intensive 5-inch, 38-caliber guns and analog fire
control system to the 1970s-era FFGs with its highly
automated, digital Mk 92 fire control system, integrating the
ship's sensors with the Mk 75 gun and missile launcher. In
propulsion, the FFG was also much more automated with
computer-controlled gas turbine engines instead of the labor-
intensive 600 pound per square inch steam propulsion system on
the earlier ship. Automated weapons and propulsion result in
a lower payroll and what came to be called the "minimum
manning concept". Maximum automation and minimum manning
have been successful on the Perry class, but present unique
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challenges as well, especially for the NRF ships, where
"minimum manning" has been taken to a new level. Table 2
presents a comparison between AF and NRF manning on the Perry
class.
TABLE 2
MANNING OF FFG-7 CLASS
AF NRF
16 officer 14 Officer 2 SELRES
198 Enlisted 145 Enlisted 54 SELRES
(Source: BUPERS Activity Manning Document)
The NRF ships have a 25.7% reduction in their full-time
manning and an overall reduction of approximately 22.4% in
mandays of labor available. The NRF ship has 49,828
mandays/year of labor available compared to 64,200 for an AF
ship. The manday figure is arrived at by counting 300 days
per full-time crew member per year and 38 days per SELRES crew
member per year.
B. PAY AND ALLOWANCES
The military pay system is one of the more complex that
could be found in any organization. All service members
receive a combination of Basic pay, allowance for quarters (in
cash or in kind), and subsistence allowance (in cash or in
kind) . In addition, there are other pays and allowances which
pertain to ship's crews such as Family Separation Allowance
(FSA), Career Sea Pay, Imminent Danger pay, Flight Deck pay
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and Reenlistment bonuses for individuals in undermanned
ratings or specialties. Two individuals in identical
paygrades, performing in identical billets could be paid
widely varying amounts based on time in grade and whether or
not that person is married or single, and whether or not that
person is living in government quarters.
Payrolls between ships can vary widely based on whether
the ship is fully manned to its Basic Allowance (BA), whether
it is in homeport (where there would be no entitlement to FSA,
Imminent Danger pay or Flight Deck pay) or whether there is
sufficient government housing in a particular homeport (if
there is a shortage of government housing, there would be
larger payments of BAQ and VHA).
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash
outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged
$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savings
of 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base). The
VAMOSC data base reflects cash payments to individuals for pay
and all allowances and re-enlistment bonuses, as well as
government contributions to FICA and Servicemens' Group Life
Insurance (SGLI). VAMOSC receives manpower data from the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service - Cleveland Center
(DFAS) and its Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS) which
makes payments to individuals in the case of direct deposit,
and records the payments by each ship's Unit Identification
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Code (UIC), whether paid centrally by direct deposit or
locally by the ship's disbursing officer.
C. BASIC PAY AND RETIREMENT ACCRUAL
Military retirement is computed using Basic Pay only.
Various allowances and bonuses are not included. The JUMPS
system which provides information to the VAMOSC data base does
not reflect retirement accruals. Intragovernmental transfer
of funds from Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) and Reserve
Personnel, Navy (RPN) appropriations to the Military
Retirement Fund are handled centrally do not show on
individual accounts and therefore are not present in JUMPS or
VAMOSC.
A discrete breakdown of Basic Pay is not available from
the VAMOSC data base. However, it is possible to assign a
portion of the Retired Pay Accrual (RIA) to the ship level by
making a few basic calculations:
a. compute Basic Pay for the ship using official pay
rates and Activity Manning Documents provided by BUPERS,
b. assign a RPA amount using tables provided by the DoD
actuary for both full-time and SELRES rates.
Table 3 provides Basic Pay data for AF and NRF ships.
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TABLE 3
FY 91 BASIC PAY (FULL-TIME)
Paygrade Rate Billets AF Total NRF Total
AF/NRF
0-5 47,832.27 1/1 47,832.27 47,832.27
0-4 39,238.50 1/1 39,238.50 39,238.50
0-3 32,280.75 4/4 129,123.00 129,123.00
0-2 25,605.62 3/3 76,816.86 76,816.86
0-1 18,727.66 7/5 131,093.62 93,638.30
E-8 26,207.03 2/2 52,414.06 52,414.06
E-7 22,016.66 12/11 264,199.92 242,183.26
E-6 18,437.99 30/26 553,139.70 479,387.74
E-5 15,058.80 46/36 692,704.80 542,116.80
E-4 12,413.61 58/44 719,989.38 546,198.84
E-3 10,843.81 47/26 509,659.07 281,939.06
3,216,211.18 12,530,888.69
(Source: Congress a Budget Justification of
of Estimates dated February 1991)
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Table 4 provides the computation for the SELRES portion of the
NRF crew:
TABLE 4
FY 91 SELRES BASIC PAY
Paygrade Billets Rate Total
0-1 2 1,976.81 3,953.62
E-7 1 2,323.98 2,323.98
E-6 4 1,646.23 7,784.92
E-5 10 1,589.54 15,895.40
E-4 18 1,310.33 23,585.94
E-3 21 1,144.62 24,037.02
56 77,580.88]
From Tables 3 and 4 we can derive that the in FY 91, a repre-
sentative annual basic pay for AF and NRF FFGs was
approximately $3,216,211.18 and $2,608,469.57, respectively.
The savings on basic pay was approximately $607,741.61 for the
NRF ship. From the above information we can further derive
the approximate Retired Pay Accrual based on each ships basic
pay.
D. RETIREMENT COMPUTATION
Three distinct retirement formulas apply for three
distinct populations in the military. For persons entering
the military prior to September 8, 1980, retirement benefits
are computed on the member's final basic pay (FINAL PAY). For
persons entering on or after September 8, 1980, the average of
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the highest 36 months of basic pay is used instead of final
basic pay. This formula is referred to as HI-3. The
retirement benefits of these first two populations are
adjusted each year by the percentage increase in the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), referred to as "full CPI protection".
Persons entering on or after August 1, 1986, have retirement
based on the final 36 months average basic pay, but their
benefits are annually increased by the change in the CPI minus
1 percent. At age 62, their benefits are restored to the
level of benefits that would have been received with full CPI
protection. After that one-time restoration, their benefits
are adjusted at CPI minus 1 percent for the rest of their
lives. This group is referred to as REDUX. In FY 92, the
population of the military was distributed as follows: 37%
entitled to FINAL PAY, 24.2% to HI-3, and 38.8% REDUX.
Reserves retire after 20 years of creditable service, the
last eight of which must be in a reserve component. Reserve
retired pay is not payable until age 60. Years are determined
using a point system where 360 points equals a year of
service. One point of service is awarded for each day of
service or drill plus 15 points for a year's membership in a
reserve component. A creditable year of service is one in
which at least 50 points are earned. A member cannot retire
without 20 creditable years, although points earned in non-
creditable years are used in the benefit calculation.
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Prior to 1983, military retirement was a "pay-as-you-go"
system, whereby the money was appropriated only for members
actually receiving their pensions in that year; this is also
referred as an unfunded system. Public Law 98-94, enacted in
September 1983, established a military retirement fund whereby
appropriated funds would be transferred into the fund based on
a percentage of a member's pay received during that year.
Appropriated funds would be transferred into the retirement
fund based on the calculated present value of the future
retirement payments for the total active duty and drilling
reserve population.
The computed retired pay accrual costs are shown in Table
5.
TABLE 5
RETIREMENT COST AS A PERCENTAGE OF BASIC PAY
Benefit Formula Full-Time SELRES
FINAL PAY 42.2 11.7
HI-3 37.2 10.8
REDUX 31.5 9.8
Weighted Avg. 36.8 10.7
(Source: Valuation of the Military Retirement System)
Table 5 percentages are the result of Net Present Value
(NPV) computations based on predicted cash flows in and out of
the Military Retirement Fund. Economic assumptions in the
actuarial model are a nominal interest rate of 7.5% on the
fund's assets (which are invested in Treasury Bonds) and
inflation rate of 5%, resulting in a real interest rate of
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2.5%. On the liability side of the computation, pay raises
are set at 5.5% per year which results in a real interest rate
of .5%. These economic assumptions were in effect in both FY
91 and 92.
As can be seen from Table 5, Reserve retirements are less
expensive than full-time retirements. This is a result of
both the point system (where a creditable year may be much
less than 360 points) and time-value of money computation
resulting from reserves (SELRES) not receiving retirement
benefits until age 60.
Using the percentages in Table 5, and the totals from
Tables 3 and 4, we can calculate the annual retirement cost
for an AF ship as $1,183,565:
($3,216,211 X 36.8%).
The retirement cost would be $939,668 for the NRF ship:
($2,530,888 X 36.8%) + ($77,580 X 10.7%).
This represents an additional $243,897 savings for the NRF
ship (which is not reflected in the VAMOSC data base) and a
total manpower savings of $1.172 million per year per ship. 5
5 Valuation of the Military Retirement System. Office of the




Maintenance of both AF and NRF Perry class frigates is
governed by the same Class Maintenance Plan (CMP).
Theoretically, there should be no difference in maintenance
costs, except those attributable to higher operating tempo
(OPTEMPO, roughly equivalent to underway days per quarter), or
differences in configuration. As to configuration, the latest
flight of frigates had RAST, fin stabilizers, Close-in Weapon
System (CIWS) 20-mm gun, and SQQ-89 sonar installed at
construction, while not all of the first and second flights
had these systems backfitted in them. (RAST - Recovery
Assistance Securing and Traversing - is the American version
of the Canadian Bear-trap system which is used to winch down
SH-60B helicopters onto the flight deck in heavy weather and
then to maneuver the helos into their hangars).
The minimum manning concept, discussed in Chapter III, has
a profound influence on the Perry class maintenance practice.
Because the ships were designed with manning constraints, it
was imperative that organizational level (0- level)
maintenance (maintenance performed by the ship's crew) be
reduced to the minimum possible level. Intermediate (I-
level) and Depot level maintenance would be increased to keep
these ships at the highest possible readiness.
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The CNO also imposed an operating availability target of
90% during the design phase of this class. Reaching 90%
availability would mean that on any day, 45 of the 50 planned
ships would be available for operational requirements, with
only five being in an extended shipyard overhaul period.
Earlier ship classes operating availability wa3 approximately
70% based on an 18-month overhaul every five years. In order
to meet these goals, the Progressive Ship Maintenance (PSM)
strategy was developed. PSM "compensates for reduced manning
by minimizing organizational level maintenance while
maintaining maximum operational availability. '6
Since these ships were built with cost constraints, there
is less redundancy than had previously been designed into
destroyer-type surface combatants (e. g. two engines vice
four, one shaft vice two, one air search radar vice two). To
maintain operational effectiveness and survivability, critical
systems are therefore replaced before they fail based on the
system's expected life or mean time between failures (MTBF)
analysis.
Each Perry class frigate has a 61-month operating cycle
during which it will receive six one-month Intermediate
Maintenance Availabilities (IMAV) accomplished by destroyer
tenders or their shore-based equivalent, the Shore
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA), two two-moith
Selected Restricted Availability (SRA), and one three-month
6 FFG-7 Class Maintenance Plan
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Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA). The SRAt
replace the eighteen-month shipyard overhaul that was commoi
in the earlier destroyers' maintenance and operating cycles.
Theoretically, the CNO's goal of 90% operational availabilit)
for this ship class is met if the SRAs are seven weeks lonc
and the DSRA is 11 weeks long vice the two and three month
peribds cited above. IMAVs do not count against the 90% goal
because the ship is not in the same state of disrepair as in
an SRA and could be made ready for sea in the event of an
emergency in a relatively short Lime.
During the remaining 48 months of the 61-month cycle, the
ship makes three six month overseas deployments, is in
homeport, the local operating areas, refresher training, law
enforcement operations, etc.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL MAINTENANCE
It is recognized that FFGs have a reduced on board self-
maintenance capability. The CMP states that tAie organization
level is tasked to:
- Maintain proper operating environment for ship's
equipment.
- Perform specified Planned Maintenance and operational
testing on a continuing bdsis.
- Perform corrective maintenance that is within
organization capability and within operational
constraints.
The CMP and design of the ship call for maximum use of
repairable modules for timely restoration of critical systems.
These modules are carried as on-board repair parts, and the
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failed units are repaired off-ship as Depot Level Repairables
(DLR). By use of DLRs and maintenance assistance modules,
trouble shooting and repair of critical systems are
accomplished quickly.
Even with the reduced O-level repair capabilities, it is
estimated that 100 of the 198 crew members (50.5%) are in
maintenance ratings on AF ships and 78 of the 145 (53.8%) on
the NRF ship (based on average Current On Board (COB)) . A









The PACFLEET frigate study (often referred to as the
Admiral Janes study) defined the above ratings as maintainers
because their work centers have ownership of the major
weapons, electronics, propulsion and auxiliary and electrical
systems of the ship. While storekeepers (SK) do not own
equipment, their primary role is to provide repair parts to
the maintenance work centers, hence their inclusion in the
7 Pacific Fleet NRF Frigate Study, 1991, chaired by RADM D.
A. Janes, USNR.
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maintainer ratings. Based on the Admiral Janes study, we
could conclude that 50-53% of the enlisted manpower costs
could be assigned to O-level maintenance.
However, even in the maintainer ratings a considerable
amount of time is devoted to professional training, general
military training, damage control training, administration,
in-port and underway watch standing. To further complicate
the issue, even non-maintainer ratings will have some damage
control planned maintenance (PMS) in their spaces. Estimated




Enlisted Manpower 1,003,371 825,939
Repair Parts 548,669 460,882
Consumables 87,294 76,156
Ships Force Matl 63,647 61,958
Repairable Modules 604,671 514,188
Totals 2,307,652 1,939,123
(Source: VAMOSC data base)
The enlisted manpower costs are a subset of the totals
provided in Chapter III. They were derived using the PACFLEET
NRF Frigate study which concluded that 50.5% of the enlisted
billets were in maintainer ratings on AF FFGs and 53.8% on the
NRF FFGs.
Table 7 represents three year (FYs 89-91) averages of
VAMOSC data element 1.1.1.3 (enlisted manpower) multiplied by
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.505 and .538 and then multiplying that product by .5 (on the
assumption that half of maintainer time is spent on
maintenance and half is spent on watch standing, training and
administrative duties).
Consumables costs were the three-year averages of VAMOSC
data element 1.2.3.2 multiplied by .5. This was done because
there is no discreet breakdown in the Navy's cost accounting
system to sort repair-related consumables (e. g. rags and
greases) from other consumables such as copying paper or paper
plates.
Ship's force material is the cost of material consumed by
the ship Is crew during an overhaul (SRA/DSRA) . It is material
issued by the shipyard for jobs to be accomplished by the
ship.
Repair parts costs were a three-year average of VAMOSC
data element 1.2.2 in the case of AF ships. For NRF ships
this data element was judged to be unreliable because the cost
of repair parts for FY 91 was $0 for all 16 ships, $0 for FFGs
23 and 25 in FY 90 and ranged from an unrealistic $8,000 (FFG-
22) to a more realistic $452,000 (FFG-25) in FY 89. As a
result of this apparently missing data, the repair parts
category for NRF FFGs in Table 7 was derived by multiplying
the AF repair parts cost by .84, on the assumption that since
the other 0-level maintenance categories (enlisted manpower,
repairable modules, S/F material, and consumables) were 84% of
the AF averages, then repair parts would account for roughly
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the same proportion of 0-level costs. The actual VAMOSC
amounts for data element 1.2.2 reflected an average cost of
$126,348 (23% of the AF cost) for repair parts over FY 89-91.
C. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MAINTENANCE
Intermediate Level maintenance on FFGs is performed by
Navy personnel at SIMAs, by Destroyer Tenders (AD), and by
Ship Repair Facility Guam and Yokosuka (SRF). Intermediate
Maintenance Activities (IMA) perform both corrective and
periodic maintenance under the CMP. I-level work includes:
- Progressive maintenance (CMP) work items; replacement
before wearout as directed by PERA (Surface).
- Corrective maintenance, including work items with
assistance from ship's force.
- Deferred planned maintenance (PMS).
- Maintenance actions based on condition
monitoring/trend analysis as approved by the Type
Commander.
- Additional essential repairs identified after
submission of the IMAV work package; the short duration
of the IMAV necessitates that such repairs be limited to
mission-essential or safety-essential repairs.






Commercial Indust- 57,663 92,208
ial Service
Totals 386,686 I 481,833
(Source: VAMOSC data base)
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The amounts in Table 8, represent three-year averages from
FYs 89-91, except for labor which is FY 91 data only. The
reason labor is not a three-year average is that labor was
greatly underreported in FY 89-90 at the IMAs. Under new
Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) rules (in effect in FY
91), IMAs have much greater incentive to report all labor
hours, because that is now the basis for determining their
operating budgets. The labor cost is the total reported labor
hours multiplied by $18.18 (by the VAMOSC program), which was
the Composite Standard Rate for the paygrade E-6, taken from
NAVCOMPT Notice 7041 for FY 91. The E-6 pay rate was selected
by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCA) based on their
study of I-level maintenance, which determined that Petty
Officer First Class was the average paygrade performing IMA
maintenance. The Composite Standard Rate includes basic pay,
allowances, and retired pay accrual for that pay grade.
The material cost is a total for data elements 2.3
(Material), 2.3.1 (Afloat Repair Parts) and 2.3.2 (Ashore
Repair Parts). It should be noted that VAMOSC reports do not
add 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 to arrive at 2.3. Those two elements are
presented independent of any other elements and totals. They
are added together in this thesis for a more complete
capturing of I-level costs.
Commercial Industrial Service (CIS) is the cost of I-level
maintenance which is contracted out due to workload
limitations at the IMAs.
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The cost of I-level maintenance is approximately 16.8% of
0-level maintenance for AF ships and 24.8% of NRF ships. Per
the VAMOSC data base, the typical NRF ship receives
approximately 25% more support from IMAs than the AF ship. As
would be expected, given their reduced manning, NRF ships need
more off-ship assistance than their AF counterparts.
D. DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
Depot level maintenance is shipyard (commercial or
government) overhaul work accomplished in support of the CMP.
As would be expected, depot-level maintenance is that type of
maintenance requiring a greater level of industrial capability
than is available at either the organizational or intermediate
level. FFGs normally receive seven months of depot-level
overhaul work during the 61 month cycle in 2 SRAs and 1 DSRA.
Depot level work consists of the following general actions:
- Preserving the underwater body; maintaining sea-
connected tanks, valves, pipes and fittings; and
maintaining the cathodic protection and prairie/masker
systems.
- Repairing the propeller, shafting, struts, reduction
gear, clutches and sonar domes.
- Repairs requiring heavy-lift capability and special
tools and test equipment.
- Installing ship alterations (SHIPALT) and ordnance
alterations (ORDALT) packages identified in the Fleet
Modernization Program (FMP).
- Accomplishing other repairs not within the capability
of the I-level as designated by the CMP. 8
8 FFG-7 Class Maintenance Plan.
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Given the capital requirements for both government and
commercial shipyards, it is not surprising that depot-level
work is very expensive. The average annual cost of depot-
level maintenance is $6.31M for each FFG, including both NRF
and AF combined (compared to the $2.73M for both 0 and I-
level). Fleet Modernization accounted for $4.38M per ship per
year, or 69% of depot-level work. When Fleet Modernization is
factored out, on average, the cost of depot-level repairs are
actually seen to be less than O-level costs ($1.93M for depot-
level v. $2.19M for O-level). Some equipment removed and
replaced under a SHIPALT or ORDALT may have needed replacement
or rework irrespective of the modernization program and that
portion of the work cannot be determined from the VAMOSC data
base. While it was surprising to the author that O-level
maintenance costs more than depot-level, it should be
considered that an FFG has O-level maintenance taking place
every day of its life, while depot-level work is taking place
during only 10% of its life. Table 9 presents a comparison of









(Source: VAMOSC data base)
Material costs are a subset of Modernization. The figures
above are three-year averages. During the period FY 89-91,
NRF ships have had lower depot-level repair costs and higher
modernization expenses than AF FFGs. The modernization costs,
however, are more of an investment than an operating cost.
The higher modernization cost for NRF ships was a result of
the Reserves operating first and second flight ships, and
NAVSEA desiring to bring these ships up to a more modern
configuration. 9  NAVSEA's philosophy has since changed with
the unveiling of a planned 340 ship fleet; now any available
FMP funds will be used on the most capable third and fourth
flight ships.
The reader should be aware that the use of averages
(means) may be misleading in the case of modernization as the
bulk of the modernization funding was expended on relatively
few ships. Even though the average annual modernization cost
is $3.8-5.6M per ship, that amount is not representative of
9 Per phone interview with CDR K. Holden and Mr. Dave Schmitt
of NAVSEA PMS-330 conducted 15 April 93.
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how the FMP is executed. For instance, FFG-7 and FFG-15
received $55M and $50M modernizations that included SQQ-89
sonar, raising maximum displacement to 4100 tons and
installation of fin stabilizers. In these two modernizations,
approximately 40% of NRF FMP funding was expended.
Additionally, FFGs 9, 11 and 14 received approximately $35M
modernizations, so approximately 73% of NRF modernization
funding was used on five ships.
In the case of AF ships, FFG-50 received a $77M
modernization consisting primarily of the Coherent Receiving
and Transmitting (CORT) upgrade to the Mk 92 fire control
system. The CORT upgrade is designed to improve detection and
tracking of incoming targets in a electronic countermeasure
(ECM) clutter environment. This modification brings FFG-50 up
to virtually the same configuration as the FFG-61 which
received CORT at new construction. Ten other AF FFGs received
extensive modernizations costing over $20M per ship; as a
result, on the AF side, $302M was expended on 11 ships, or 75%




The categories of operating costs are fuel and lubricants
(POL - petroleum, oil, lubricants), ammunition expenditure,
purchased services, which includes utilities, and
equipment/equipage replacement. Fuel costs are driven by
Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO). OPTEMPO for ships not undergoing
an SRA/DSRA is set at a level that allows them to achieve and
sustain the level of training readiness that their Type
Commanders (COMNAVSURFLANT and COMNAVSURFPAC) consider
necessary to support deployed operations. OPTEMPO is used to
budget the expenditure of fuel. AF ships are allotted 51
underway days per quarter while deployed and 29 days per
quarter when not deployed. NRF ships are allotted 18 days per
quarter (source: NAVCOMPT, CNO code N-82). It would be
logical that based on their higher OPTEMPO that AF ships would
have higher fuel costs and a resultant higher state of
readiness because of the greater opportunity for underway





89 90 91 Average
AF 981,978 835,461 1,807,206 1,210,390
NRF 637,063 592,500 1,099,938 776,500(Source: VAMOSC data base)
During the three year span of this study, the average NRF
ship consumed 64.15% as much POL as its AF counterpart which
is what would be expected given the OPTEMPO constraints placed
on it. This represents a $433,890 savings per NRF ship per
year. Ninety-nine percent of the POL cost consists of Navy
distillate fuel (F-76) which is burned in both the LM-2500 gas
turbine engines and in the four ships service diesel
generators, with the remainder being engine or reduction gear
lubricating oil. The Desert Shield deployments caused a
dramatic increase in POL costs in FY 91.
Other major categories of operating expenses are
expendable ammunition, equipage, and purchased services













Totals J 2,110,502 1,526,435
(Source: VAMOSC data base)
Utilities are a subset of Purchased Services. The data
above are three-year averages from the VAMOSC data base,
except for NRF utilities. This data element (1.3.3) had a
cost of $0.00 for all NRF FFGs except the Copeland, FFG-25.
The $253,696 cited above is a computed using a master's thesis
by Patrick Reardon which compared utility costs in FFGs and
FFs and concluded that on average, NRF FFGs had utility costs
32.94% higher than AF FFGs.10 The NRF utility cost is the AF
utility multiplied by 1.3294. Reardon's thesis concluded that
the NRF ship has higher utility charges because of lower
OPTEMPO; more days in port means lower fuel costs but higher
utility costs. For comparison, the NRF frigate Copeland (FFG-
10 Reserve Manning of the FF-1052 and FFG-7 Class Frigates:
A Critique of the Accuracy and Completeness of Existing Costing
Studies, Patrick R. Rearden, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA, 1987.
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25) had utility expenses that averaged $291,000 during period
FY 89-91. However, based on Reardon's thesis, $291,000
appears to be too high to use as a representative amount for
NRF FFG utility costs .
In addition to utilities, purchased services includes ADP
equipment and service rentals, printing services, telephone
service, and postage charges.
The ammunition category includes the cost of 76mm, and
20mm gun ordnance, missile training shots, small arms and
pyrotechnics. The higher cost attributed to AF units is a
result of the requirement that deploying ships get more
opportunities to practice live firing exercises as part of the
deployment workups. NRF vhips have fewer opportunities for
this.
Equipment/Equipage is the cost of items classified as
neither consumables nor repair parts. This category of
equipment is subject to a higher degree of control because of
high unit cost, vulnerability to pilferage or essentiality to
ships mission. Examples include foul weather gear,
binoculars, and electronic test equipment. (Source: VAMOSC
volume I).
Non-maintenance supplies are consumable items such as
copying paper, paper plates, cleaning gear and toilet paper.
For the purposes of this thesis, this cost was derived by
taking the consumable data element 1.2.3.2 and multiplying by
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.5 on the assumption that half of the consumables used art
repair-related and half are not.
The NRF ship has operating costz $584,067 less t' an the A]
ship and 74% of this savings is a direct result of lowei
OPTEMPO and the resultant saving in fuel costs.
B. INDIRECT COSTS
Indirect costs include off-ship training, publications,
ammunition handlinq, and engineering technical services (ETS).
These costs are available from VAMOSC data elements 4.1
through 4.4.
Training (element 4.1) is the cost of "C" and "F" school
courses applicable to ships. This category is essentially ar
allocation of overhead for the shore training support that
these ships receive. The allocation base chosen by the Naval
Center for Cost Analysis (NCA) and the Naral Education and
Training Program Management Support Activity (NETPMSA) is tne
nurher of personnel assigned to the ship. For example, the
total allocated cost for officer courses is determined by
NETPMSA calculating the total cost of all officer shipboard
training courses. This amount is then divided by the total
number of officers assiqned to all ships. The cost per
officer is then multiplied by the number of officers assigned
to each ship to obtain a per ship officer training cost. A
similar logic is used by NETPMSA for enlisted training
courses. The cost allocated to AF FFGs was $376,751 per ship
in FY91 and $285,438 for NRF ships. Fiscal Year 1991 was the
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first year that this data element was computed for VAMOSC.
Because allocation bases are notoriously arbritary and there
is no way of verifying the accuracy of this particular
allocation base, the averages for training will not be
included in per ship totals later in this thesis.
Engineering Technical Services (element 4.3) costs are the
costs of engineering services incurred by the ship while not
in IMA or depot availability. Ammunition handling (4.4) is
the cost of on-loading/off-loading the ship's ammunition by
Naval Weapon Stations and is recorded against the ship's Unit
Identification Code. The per ship cost for 4.2, .3 and .4 was
$122,084 for AF ships and $118,872 for NRF ships. These data
are based on FY 91 costs from the VAMOSC data base.
35
VI. DEPRECIATION COSTS
A. RATIONALE FOR DEPRECIATION
Depreciation is a method used by industry to indicate the
loss of value of capital items as they are used over their
lives. Depreciation is not generally used in government
accounting and is in fact used in business largely for the tax
advantage derived from having lower profits as a result of
the additional expense. This thesis does not advocate the use
of depreciation as a matter of routine. Theoretical
depreciation schedules will be done for selected FFGs in this
thesis strictly as an academic endeavor to provide information
on how much the annual ship operating expenses would be
effected if this method of accounting were used.
Depreciation is defined as "that portion of the cost of a
tangible operating asset that is recognized as expense in each
period of the asset's life."'" In business accounting,
assets as valuable (330 million each in 1991 dollars) as Perry
class frigates would merit capitalization (i. e. placement in
an asset account) and expensing over time through
depreciation. In traditional government accounting, funds
are simply obligated when a contract for construction of the
ship is signed and then expended (i. e. paid to the shipyard)
" Financial Accounting, Robert K. Eskew and Daniel L. Jensen
McGraw-Hill, 1992.
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through progress payments as the ship is completed, is
outfitted and goes through post-shakedown availability (PSA).
What matters most in government accounting is the obligation
and expenditure of funds.
In business, under Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) and a standard double-entry accounting
system, the acquisition of a $330,000,000 asset would be
recorded as a debit (increase) to the capital equipment
account and a credit (decrease) to the cash (or accounts
payable) account. There would be no net change in the firm's
asset position, as one $330 million asset (cash) had been
exchanged for another (a ship). The expense would be recorded
as depreciation over the life of the ship; 1/30th or $11M per
year for 30 years using straight-line depreciation.
In government accounting, there would be an obligation of
$330M at contract signing and expenditures totalling $330M as
the ship was built and delivered, with the final progress
payment being made after PSA. The outlay of $330M is
recognized as an expenditure, but the receipt of a ship is not
recognized as an asset in official financial accounting
records. For the government, there is a net loss (the cash
outlay) of $330M up front and no depreciation expense over the
30-year life of the ship.
B. STRAIGHT-LINE METHOD
The straight-line method is the simplest method of
depreciation. As the name implies, this method would allocate
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an equal amount of the acquisition cost to each year of the
ship's expected life. Use of the straight-line method implies
that an equal amount of utility is obtained from the asset
during each year of its life. Surface combatants have a
nominal life of 30 years, so in our hypothetical depreciation
schedule 1/30th of the depreciable cost would be expensed each
year. Under GAAP, the historical cost of the asset is used
with no adjustment upward to account for inflation or increase
in market value.
The median cost of AF frigates was $191,633,000 for the
Crommelin, FFG-37. Under the straight-line method, the annual
depreciation expense for FFG-37 would be $6,387,767. The
median cost for NRF FFGs is the mid-point between Fahrion,
FFG-22 and Lewis B. Puller, FFG-23, which is $139,348,500.
Using this median price, a representative annual depreciation
expense for NRF FFGs can be calculated -- $4,644,950. Various
theoretical depreciation expenses are shown in Table 12.
TABLE 12
SRAIGHT-LINE DEPRECIATION EXPENSE
Ship Acquisition Cost Annual Depreciation
FFG-7 NRF 272,800,000 9,093,333
FFG-22/23 139,348,500 4,644,950
FFG-15 NRF 103,424,000 3,477,483
FFG-61 AF 383,678,000 12,789,267
FFG-37 AF 191,633,000 6,387,767
FFG-26 AF 109,799,000 3,659,967
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The source of acquisition costs was NAVSEA 017 Ship
acquisition data base (the rounding to the nearest thousand
was done in the data base). The ships selected represent the
high, median and low costs for the AF and NRF categories in
order to show the range of depreciation expense that would
result.
If depreciation expense (straight-line method) were used
in government accounting, it would add between $3.5 and $12.8M
per year to each ship's operating and support costs. FFG-7
was the highest cost NRF ship costing 272 million 1973
dollars. FFG-61 was the highest cost AF ship and its costs
are shown in 1984 dollars.
C. ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION
The sum-of-the-year's-digits (SOYD) method is a fairly
common accelerated depreciation method used on the assumption
that most of an asset's value is consumed early in its life
(which is debatable in the case of ships). This method
assigns a higher rate of depreciation in the first years based
on a ratio that uses the sum of the digits in the asset's
life. For a ship with a 30-year life, this would involve
adding the numbers 1+2+3...+29+30 to get 465. The ratio used
for the first year depreciation would be 30/465 which equals
.064516129. In other words approximately 6.5% of the
depreciable cost would be expensed in the first year and only
approximately .2% would be expensed in the thirtieth year.
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For FFG-61, the first year's expense would be $24,753,419 and
its last year's would be approximately $825,113 under this
system (in actual practice in SOYD, the depreciation amount
for the last year is whatever is left in the account in order
to reach $0.00).
Table 13 lists hypothetical depreciation that would be
expensed in 1991 under SOYD depreciation.
TABLE 13
SOYD DEPRECIATION EXPENSE







The depreciation amounts above are derived by taking the year
the ship commissioned (commissioning date was December 1977
for FFG-7) and counting backwards from 30. Since 1991 was
FFG-7's 14th year in commission, and counting backwards from
30, the ratio is 17/465 or .038709. The acquisition cost
(from Table 12) was 272,800,000.
272,800,000 x .038709 = 9,973,333
Under SOYD depreciation schedules, the depreciation for
1991 would range from a low of $4.4M "ip to $24M, a
substantial increase from the straight-line method. The
reason for the higher expense under SOYD is that none of the
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ships had reached the half-way point of their lives based on
a 30-year life. FFG-61's expenses would be especially
affected since it was commissioned in 1989.
What does depreciation tell us? It takes into account the
building cost and spreads that out over the lifetime of the
asset. Depreciation makes the owner cognizant of the cost of
an asset and this cost is taken into account in the
utilization of the asset over its entire life. Government
accounting treats the construction cost of an asset as a sunk
cost (and therefore not relevant in deciding how the asset is
used). However, the fact that the government could sell the
ship makes it not literally a sunk cost. Therefore, a case
could be made for depreciating the construction of the ship.
In business accounting, the construction cost is relevant
because it is not treated as a sunk cost (part of the
construction cost will show as an expense on the business'
income statement every year of the depreciable life of the
asset).
What would be the operating and support cost of FFGs if
the government used depreciation? Table 14 provides the
totals for all operating and support costs.
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TABLE 14









The costs cited above are taken from previous tables in this
thesis. They are based on VAMOSC data with deviations from
VAMOSC as described in the above text. The maintenance
category has the enlisted manpower costs subtracted out but
modernization costs are still included. The depreciation cost
is theoretical and reflects the straight-line depreciation
based on the median acquisition costs.
Table 14 summarizes all operating and support costs for
the first time in this thesis. Not counting depreciation, the
operating and support cost difference is $979,390 in favor of





The engineering examination for ships consists of Light
Off Examinations (LOE) and Operational Propulsion Plant
Examinations (OPPE). "LOEs and OPPEs conducted by the
Propulsion Examining Board (PEB), reflect current fleet
standards for the measurement of engineering readiness." 12
The LOE/OPPE consists of:
- Material condition; a comprehensive evaluation of the
ships main propulsion and auxiliary machinery spaces and
equipment.
- Level of knowledge; written and oral testing of
engineering department personnel to determine skill
levels and effectiveness of training.
- Administration; inspection of engineering department
training records, engineering logs, lube oil program,
etc.
- Firefighting; evaluating of the ship's ability to
control large fires in the engineering main spaces.
- Operations; evaluation of the engineering watch
sections to safely operate the engineering plant in both
normal and emergency conditions.
The LOE includes the first four categories, and the OPPE has
all five. These are extremely demanding exams and failure can
have severe consequences for the careers of the senior
engineering personnel and the commanding officer.
12 Pacific Fleet NRF Frigate Study.
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How have the ships performed on these exams and is there
a difference between AF and NRF ships? The NRF PACFLT Frigate
Study documented that during the period 1981-1991 AF FFGs
failed the OPPE/LOE 17 times in 94 examinations or 18.1% of
the time. NRF FFGs failed in 8 of 29 inspections, for a
failure rate of 27.58%. In the interim period since the study
was released in August 1991, NRF FFGs have failed 5 of 18, so
the NRF failure rate is holding about steady; AF FFGs have
failed once in 16 examinations for a rate of 6.35% The total




Category No. Exams No. Failures Failure Rate
AF 109 18 16.5%
NRF 47 13 27.7%
The source of the above data is the PACFLT frigate study and
LOE/OPPE message reports provided by COMNAVSURFPAC code N8 for
the period since August 1991.
In one recent inspection, the Thach (FFG-43) experienced
a main engine casualty during the underway period of the OPPE,
resulting in an incomplete in October 91. The incomplete is
not counted in the above summary.
Table 15 indicates a measurable difference exists in
engineering readiness and training between AF and NRF FFGs.
To quote from the PACFLT study:
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With fewer personnel onboard, NRF ships have a reduced
capability to self-train because the Engineering Casualty
Control Training Team (ECCTT) is the off-going watch
section. This limits the number of drills that can be
run because the ECCTT must go back on watch in four
hours, and it must comply with fatigue and heat stress
safety requirements. Additionally, with less skilled
personnel and fewer available manhours, it is impossible
to perform all the required maintenance. The limited
supervisory personnel are spread thin as a result of
manning cuts, with no corresponding cut in requirements
or responsibilities...This is particularly evident on
already minimally manned FFGs.
The fact that NRF ships are 67% more likely to fail a major
engineering inspection than their AF counterpart is most
likely a direct result of reduced manning. This thesis does
not have a methodology for assigning a financial cost
associated with reduced engineering readiness, but with
reduced manning and its $1,171,569 saving per year per ship,
comes a higher probability of lower engineering readiness.
With lower engineering readiness, additional management
attention (both on-ship and off-ship) must be devoted to
passing the re-OPPE or re-LOE and there is an opportunity cost
associated with this.
B. MATERIAL CONDITION
As evidenced in the LOE/OPPE examination, material
condition is more likely to be degraded in engineering
equipment and spaces. In the PACFLT frigate study, one other
area of material condition was cited - the Current Ships
Maintenance Project (CSMP). The CSMP is a listing and
description of all open (incomplete) maintenance actions.
These actions are recorded by a Job Control Number (JCN). In
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August of 1991, the average NRF FFG CSMP contained 1761 jobs
and the average for AF FFGs was 1427. The NRF CSMP was 23%
larger than the AF. The PACFLT study concluded that this was
more a result of homeport than of NRF status. Long Beach-
based ships had a much higher JCN count than San Diego-based
ships; and most of the NRF ships are stationed in Long Beach.
They attributed the larger maintenance backlog to the SIMA at
Long Beach. As a result of the PACFLT frigate study, the
maintenance backlog was closely managed with the result that
the average JCN count now stands at 991 for NRF and 948 for
the AF (Source: Maintenance Resource Management System data
provided by NAVSEA Detachment PERA (Surface) Philadelphia,
PA.)
The CSMPs have been successfully reduced and probably
reflect a higher state of readiness for both AF and NRF FFGs.
But it should be noted that regardless of the cause, the
larger CSMP on the NRF ship probably was reflected as a
maintenance cost avoidance in FYs 89-91 and likely required
higher expenditures in I-level and depot level for FY 92s and
93. Fiscal Year 1992/1993 VAMOSC data was not available for
this thesis. The VAMOSC is generally available in the June of
the next year.
C. SUPPLY MMIAGEMENT
In the area of supply management, the NRF ships are
actually outperforming their AF counterparts. As judged by
COMNAVSURFPAC Supply Management Assessments (SMA), NRF FFGs
46





- Level of Knowledge
The PACFLT frigate study reported hiqher scores for the NRF
FFGs and that trend has continued in the period since the
study was released. The grades assigned are Failing,
Marginal, Good, Excellent and Outstanding. By assigning a
numeric value of 0 = Failing, 1 = Marginal, 2 = Good, 3 =
Excellent, and 4 = Outstanding, it is possible to compute
average scores for each category of ship. These scores are




ACC SUS CS LK Avg.
AF 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.4
NRF 2.75 3.0 2.6 2.75 2.775
1991-1992 SMA Cycle
AF 2.22 2.11 2.44 2.33 2.275
NRF 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.4 2.55
The 1991-92 inspection cycle includes SMAs on 5 NRF and 9 AF
FFGs. In the area of supply management, the reduced manning
is not a detriment to how well the supply department can do on
its major inspection and, by extrapolation, the NRF FFG
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actually appears to be getting better support from its sapply
department than its AF counterpart. It 'would be nonsensical
to say that reduced manning is an advantage for NRF supply
departments; rather, it appears that reC iced OPTEMPO gives the
NRF supply department additional opportunities to use off-ship




The bottom line is that sending an FFG from the Active
Fleet to the Naval Reserve Force saves about $979,000 per
year, or about 6.1% of all operating and support costs. This
figure penalizes the NRF because it includes the modernization
costs under depot-level repair. NRF ships are flights I and
II and during 1989-1990, NAVSEA was attempting to modernize
these ships (1989-1990) with the effect that NRF hulls
received an average of $1.754M per ship more than AF ships
under the Fleet Modernization Program. This expenditure was
a discretionary cost and could have been avoided completely by
freezing the configuration of those ships. With the FMP delta
factored out, the savings of NRF vis a vis AF FFGs would be
$2.733M per ship. This figure may penalize AF frigates
because they are ordered to maintain a higher OPTEMPO and
their depot-level maintenance costs are bound to be higher
because of their more advanced configuration (RAST, SQQ-89,
CIWS, fin stabilizer). Because AF and NRF FFGs are under the
same class maintenance plan, it would be logical to expect
roughly similar maintenance costs except for differences
attributable to higher OPTEMPO or configuration. This brings
us back to manpower savings - the $1,171,569 per year. The
author of this thesis is of the opinion that manpower is the
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true savings in this whole equation. In total then, the NRF
FFG program saves a total of $18,745,000 per year; the cost of
one Active Fleet FFG. In other words, by instituting the NRP
surface ship program the Navy is able to operate the current
mix of 35 AF and 16 NRF FFGs for the same cost as would be
incurred by operating 50 AP FIGs. This means that the Navy
gives up a full 15 deployable ships in return for only 16 NRF
ships. The Naval Reserve surface program is not the force
multiplier that was envisioned in the early 1980s.
On the other hand, if the reader is of the opinion that
$2.854M is the real per ship savings, then the Navy-wide
savings would be $43,728,000 per year; under this assumption,
the number of AF FFGs that could be operated at the same cost
as the current mix would be between 48 and 49. In that case,
the Navy gives up at least 13 deployable ships in exchange for
16 NRF ships. The Naval Reserve surface program has allowed
the Navy to have a slightly larger Order of Battle, but at a
cost of reduced readiness for 14 to 16 ships, and with
significantly fewer deployable assets.
From these savings one would have to deduct any cost of
duplication between active and reserve areas. To quote from
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
We found areas of active and reserve forces that, if
eliminated, better integrate the Total Force and preserve
robust combat capabilities at lower cost. One such
example is the parallel headquarters structures in the
active and reserve components... In the Navy, there is
a Commander, Naval Reserve Force; A Commander, Naval Air
Reserve; and a Commander, Naval Surface Reserve, each
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with a headquarters staff duplicating the functions of
one another and of the Active Navy component."
By being in the business of operating surface ships, the Naval
Reserve is forced to duplicate staff functions of the Active
Navy. The costs of operating headquarters staff is beyond the
scope of this thesis, but it could cut considerably into the
$18M-44M savings achieved at the shipboard level by the NRF
FFG program.
In a period of tight budgets, $18.75M-43.73M in savings is
not to be dismissed lightly. On the other hand, one has to
ask what is being bought for the money, regardless of any
savings. It costs $245M per year in operating and support
costs for the 16 NRF FFGs but they do not deploy. Can the
Navy afford this large an annual expenditure on ships that are
relegated to a training role only?
Civilian industry would not routinely underutilize capital
assets in that way, except for short periods of time during a
business down-turn. One reason they would not is that annual
depreciation expense would be a visible reminder of initial
cost of the capital item. As stated in Chapter VI, the
initial cost is not treated as a sunk cost in business
accounting.
Of course the Navy is not a civilian business. The Navy
is in the business of projecting America's power overseas in
13 Report on the Roles. Missions. and Functions of the Armed
Forces of the United States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, December 1992.
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both peace and in war, generally through forward deployment.
"The purpose of forward deployment is not only to 'show the
flag' but to ensure that the United States can respond to a
crisis almost immediately.',14 The Navy is unique among all
the services in that 25 percent of its combat-capable forces
are forward deployed at any time. Because the other services
are not routinely forward deployed, a large reserve component
appears to be a logical force structure. Because the Navy is
routinely forward deployed, a large reserve component may be
an illogical force structure.
Also, the utilization of 16 FFGs in the Naval Reserve
Force is only possible as long as there are "excess" assets
available. If Active Fleet OPTEMPO begins to exceed the CNO's
stated limit, as it did in t~e Persian Gulf War, then some of
this excess capacity no longer exists. As the Navy approaches
a 340-ship Fleet (referred to as "Aspin Option C"), it will
become more difficult to justify ships that do not deploy,
especially as AF ships are forced to exceed stated OPTEMPO
limits.
B. GULF WAR EXPERIENCE
The Gulf War will not be an accurate predictor of every
future crisis involving the use of American armed forces, and
it is dangerous and naive (indeed amateurish) to assume that
we will have the advantages that we did in Desert
14 Navy Active and Reserve Force Structure and Mix Study,
Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., 1992.
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Shield/Desert Storm in future hostilities; for example, future
conflicts will not likely have ready-made infrastructure in-
theater and an enemy who is willing to let American forces
have six months to deploy massive forces without interference.
But the war may be illuminating in one respect: it is probably
a good example of how to employ Naval Reserve Forces in the
future. The Naval Reserve units and personnel who
participated in Desert Storm were mainly medical (10,456
personnel), mobile construction (2,475), logistics augment
units (1,991), ship and SIMA augment personnel (1,783), cargo-
handling battalions (961), logistic airlift squadrons (691)
and Military Sealift Command (489).15 Perhaps these units
should be the future focal point for the Naval Reserve. "In
the past, Naval Reserve capabilities -- and active Navy
capabilities -- were structured and staffed for a global war
and not necessarily focused on these resources needed in
regional contingency. Consequently, the Gulf War experience
identified the reserve capabilities that might be most
directly applicable to projected contingency requirements.
And, conversely, it revealed those reserve capabilities that
might not be used heavily in this type and size of
contingency.',16  NRF FFGs were not recalled in the Gulf War
and are not likely to be deployed in future regional




likely to happen. The scenario of convoy battles in the
Atlantic against wolf packs of Soviet SSNs and SSGNs has gone
away. "As we reduce the active force structure, DoD has been
working with Congress to also reduce the reserve component, in
a balanced way. The goal is to eliminate reserve elements,
primarily Army, which are no longer required to face threats
that have disappeared -- threats that led to the significant
build-up in the 1980s in our reserve component structure.', 7
The Naval Reserve surface program was expanded as a result
of Cold War planning scenarios that are now outdated. While
it may be more glamorous to be associated with combat-capable
forces, such as FFGs, the real payoff for the Naval Reserve
will likely be in medical, transportation, and logistics
areas. By concentrating in these areas, needless duplication
will be eliminated and the Total Force objectives will be
achieved at a lower cost.
17 Report on the Roles. Missions and Functions of the Armed
Force of the United States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
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